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Abstract
US earnings inequality has increased dramatically since the 1970s, and the prospect
of a reversal depends on what caused the trend. The standard explanation emphasizes
skill-biased technical change. This paper briey considers some aggregation issues and
then proceeds to outline two alternative perspectives power biased technical change
and the e¤ects of induced mismatch in the labor market and their implications.
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1 Introduction
Distribution has been central to classical economic theory as well as to the various strands
of Post-Keynesian and structuralist macroeconomics. As a simplifying assumption, how-
ever, labor is typically taken as homogeneous, and the main focus has been on the func-
tional distribution of income between wages and prots (with rents as an additional cat-
egory in some versions). Kurz and Salvadori (1995, ch. 11) is a prominent exception but
their treatment of labor heterogeneity stays at a high level of abstraction, and a large
part of their analysis serves to clarify the conditions that would allow a reduction of het-
erogeneous to homogenous labor. This paper, by contrast, has heterogeneity as its focal
point: simplifying assumptions of homogeneity may be justied for many purposes, but
labor disaggregation is essential if one wants to address some of the most striking changes
in inequality over the last 100 years.
As shown in gure 1, the long-term variations in the prot share are relatively mild.
It drops about 4 percentage points between 1950 and 1980 and then recovers, rising about
2 percentage points during the neoliberal era. The calculation of the prot share raises
many issues and the gure may give a misleading impression of the recent trend. CEO
pay has increased dramatically, and at least a part of this increase should be included with
prots. Adjustments along these lines have been made by Krueger (1999), but even with
these adjustments, the functional distribution fails to tell the main story.
Figure 2 shows a di¤erent measure of inequality for the period since 1917. The uc-
tuations in income share have been particularly strong at the top end, but signicant
changes have occurred throughout the distribution, and wage movements are central to
these changes.1 What is remarkable in gure 2 is not just the increase in the share of
the top decile that took place since 1980 but also the Great Compression in the early
1940s, when inequality dropped dramatically in just a few years. This development raises
the intriguing possibility of a parallel between the 1940s and the present. The neoliberal
era from the 1980s, the nancial bubbles, and the crisis have similarities with the runup
to the great depression, and one might wonder whether the scene has been set for a new
compression.
Figures 1-2 about here
The great compression of the 1940s was supported by institutional changes.2 Federal
1This is the case even at the top end. According to Piketty and Saez (2003, p. 3)
the increase in top income shares in the last three decades is the direct consequence of the
surge in top wages. As a result, the composition of income in the top income groups has
shifted dramatically over the century: the working rich have now replaced the coupon-clipping
rentiers.
2The war played a part in the timing and pace of the compression. But compressions occurred in
countries like Sweden and Spain that stayed out of the second world war, and it would be hard to explain
the durability of the compression on the basis of the war.
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legislation in the late 1930s strengthened labor unions, extensions of social insurance im-
proved workersbargaining position, and there were important changes with respect to
workplace health and safety, minimum wages, and statutory overtime pay. Institutional
changes also accompanied the increasing inequality in the de-compression period federal
labor relations law weakened, unions declined, industries were deregulated, and the min-
imum wage was allowed to fall and studies by DiNardo et al. (1996) and Lee (1999) nd
that de-unionization and the falling minimum wage can account for a substantial share of
the rise in wage inequality between 1970 and 1988.
The argument for institutional determinants of the observed movements in inequality
has obvious appeal. It is easy to see how changes in policies and institutions since the
late 1970s may have put downward pressure on low-skill wages, and there is no doubt
that neoliberal ideas have taken a blow and that new openings have been created by the
economic crisis. There is a real potential for a break with neoliberal policies. But this does
not guarantee that a break will happen, and the prospects of a successful break depends
in part on the employment e¤ects of a reduction in inequality.
A decrease in the relative wage of low-skill workers leads to a rise in the demand for
low-skill workers in a standard model of the labor market. Contrary to this prediction,
low-skill workers have lost ground in terms of both wages and employment since the 1970s.
Relative wages and relative employment have moved in the same direction, and this has
been interpreted as evidence of skill-biased technical change (SBTC): rms have chosen to
employ an increasing proportion of those workers who have become relatively expensive,
and prot maximizing rms will not do that without shifts in marginal products (e.g.
Acemoglu 2002 and Autor et al. 2008).
This TINA argument for SBTC ("There Is No Alternative", as Margaret Thatcher
used to tell her critics) has implications for an assessment of both past trends and future
prospects. Institutional changes cannot be blamed for increasing inequality if skill biases
lie behind the observed trends in employment and inequality since attempts to prevent the
increase by maintaining or raising the real value of minimum wage would have resulted
in unemployment for low-skill workers.3 Looking ahead, the SBTC hypothesis suggests
that only changes in the skill composition of the labor force  education and training
programs can ensure a lasting reduction of inequality without causing unemployment.
Undoubtedly, improvements in education are desirable but the story of SBTC has
many weaknesses,4 and the TINA argument is false. The SBTC argument is usually cast
in the context of a one-sector model, and this paper rst considers aggregation problems
that could invalidate the conclusions. The empirical relevance of these aggregation issues
is unclear, but two other mechanisms may account for the observed co-variation of wages
and employment. The two mechanisms are distinct, but not mutually exclusive.
Like the SBTC story, the rst alternative focuses on technology. Skill biases in tech-
3This was a standard argument for high unemployment in Europe in the 1980 and 1990s, but see Howell
et al. (2007) for a critical examination of the evidence.
4E.g. Howell (1999) and Card and Dinardo (2002).
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nological change clearly could a¤ect distribution, but other biases may have been more
important. The great compression of incomes in the early 1940s can be seen as a response
to the limitations of the available information and communications technologies (ICT) for
the coordination and control of the new, large enterprises that had been created in the pre-
ceding decades. The burdens of coordinating large, complex, and geographically dispersed
companies enhanced the bargaining power of those lower in the hierarchy and reduced that
of top managers. The abruptness of the compression clearly has to be explained by insti-
tutional changes (and the war), but the underlying problems of coordination and control
facilitated these changes. From the 1970s onwards, advances in ICT led to improvements
in coordination and control, and these improvements reduced the agency rents accruing
to those lower in the corporate hierarchies. In short, technological changes may have been
important for the movements in inequality, not because of skill bias but because of their
power bias: the changes have a¤ected the ability of di¤erent groups to extract rents (Skott
and Guy 2007; Guy and Skott 2008)).
The second alternative is based on the observation that many workers fail to get jobs
that make use of their qualications. This mismatch in the labor market and the degree
of mismatch  can be determined endogenously using an e¢ ciency wage model (Skott
2005, 2006), and Slonimczyk and Skott (2010) use this setting to examine the e¤ects
of changes in minimum wages. We show that a rise in the minimum wage can have
monopsonistic e¤ects: low-wage workers gain from this rise both in terms of wages and
employment, and aggregate unemployment may fall. Thus, in the US, the decline in the
minimum wage since the late 1970s is consistent with the observed patterns in inequality
and relative employment, and there may be no need to invoke biases in technological
change. According to the mismatch argument, moreover, policy initiatives that help to
reverse the increase in inequality need not have adverse e¤ects on employment; they may
even be benecial, also in terms of employment.
Section 2 presents a simple example of paradoxical aggregation e¤ects, section 3 dis-
cusses the PBTC argument in greater detail, and section 4 takes up the question of endo-
genous mismatch and its implications. A nal section o¤ers a few concluding comments
on policy implications and the links between inequality and the nancial crisis.
2 Aggregation
The one-sector argument for SBTC is simple. Assuming a well-behaved aggregate pro-
duction function with constant returns to scale and only two inputs, high- and low-skill
labor, we have
Y = F (NH ; NL; t) (1)
where NH and NL denote the input of high- and low-skill labor, respectively, and the time
parameter (t) is included to allow for technical change.
The rst-order conditions for prot maximization imply that
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wH
wL
=
FNH
FNL
= f(
NH
NL
; t) with fNH=NL < 0 (2)
where subscripts are used to denote partial derivatives. This equation implies that if
relative employment and relative wages move in the same direction, it must be because of
shifts in the production function. The one-sector assumption excludes changes in relative
prices and the composition of output, and the production function denes an inverse
relation between relative wages and (the prot maximizing) employment ratio.
The factor substitution in this case is not between capital and labor, but between two
di¤erent kinds of labor, each of which is taken as homogenous and measurable in well-
dened units, and the supply of which may be taken as exogenous (for simplicity). The
well-known problems of re-switching and capital reversal can not arise in this case, but the
one-sector assumption is restrictive and the inverse relation need not hold in a multisector
setting.
As a simple example, assume that there are two consumption goods and that each of
them is produced using a xed coe¢ cient production function,
C1 = minfNH1; NL1g (3)
C2 = minfNH2; NL2g (4)
where Ci and Nki are the output of good i and the input of Nk in its production, re-
spectively, and  is a positive constant. Using low-skill wages as the numeraire, letting !
denote the high-skill wage, and assuming that wages are paid at the end of production,
the price equations are given by
p1 = ! +  (5)
p2 = ! + 1 (6)
The composition of output is determined by demand, and it is assumed that high-skill
workers spend all their income on good 1 while low-skill workers consume only good 2,
p1C1 = !NH = !(NH1 +NH2) (7)
p2C2 = NL = NL1 +NL2 (8)
Equations (3)-(8) can be used to nd the employment ratio NH=NL as a function of the
relative wage !:
NH
NL
=
! + 
! + 1
(9)
Hence
@NHNL
@!
> 0 if  < 1 (10)
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In this example, a positive covariance between relative employment and relative wages
is obtained if the high-skill intensity of production in sector one whose output is con-
sumed by high-skill workers exceeds that of sector 2. The intuition is straightforward.
The simplifying production and consumption assumptions exclude substitution both in
production and in the consumption pattern of each type of worker. The aggregate e¤ects
on employment come from sectoral shifts associated with distributional change: as the re-
lative wage increases, consumption shifts towards the good that is produced intensively by
high-skill workers. The extreme assumptions in this example can be relaxed: a su¢ ciently
strong distributional e¤ect can dominate the substitution e¤ects (which for simplicity were
set to zero in the example).
The empirical relevance of these aggregation/distribution e¤ects is questionable. The
analysis has taken ! as exogenous, while a neoclassical approach would endogenize the
relative wage: for a given relative supply of labor, equation (9) can be solved for the
market clearing relative wage. A positive correlation between employment and relative
wages, however, would imply that standard tatonnement mechanisms became unstable.
Relative wages above the market clearing solution would produce an excess demand for
high-skill workers and a tendency for the relative wage to rise further. Putting it di¤erently,
if one believes that market induced changes in relative wages tend to produce (near-) full
employment, cases which produce the positive correlation in (9) must be excluded.
This stability argument may not carry much weight, but empirical evidence points to-
wards the same conclusion. The shift towards increased skill intensity can be found across
all industries, and it follows that the observed aggregate increase in high-skill employment
cannot be explained as a compositional e¤ect.5
The rest of this paper considers explanations that do not depend on shifts in the
sectoral composition of output. Output will be taken as homogeneous, and non-Walrasian
labor markets, instead, will play the key role.
3 Power-Biased Technological Change
An advertisement from the "Parts Bin" in the Daily Hampshire Gazette (my local news-
paper in Amherst, MA), can be used as a simple illustration of the main point. The ad
shows a picture of a "Fleet Black Box" and explains how this device gives the owner of a
truck the ability to
monitor driver performance as it pertains to obeying the law, safety and keep-
ing operating costs in check (fuel economy, etc.) simply by plugging the Road
Safety RS-2000 Fleet Black Box into the OBD II port of any 1996 and newer
vehicle. You set the guidelines for high-speed driving, hard cornering, hard
5The issue has received a lot of attention since explanations of the wage-employment patterns that
based on foreign trade e¤ects come up against similar problems (e.g. Autor et al. 1998).
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breaking/acceleration and other aggressive behaviors. According to the man-
ufacturer, the RS-2000 is tamper-proof and o¤ers second-by-second reporting
of vehicle speed, G-Force, throttle position and even interior sound level.
As it says on the manufacturers webpage, "it is like being able to sit next to every
one of your drivers every second they drive" (http://www.roadsafety.com/eet.php).
This technology marks a shift in the relationship between truck drivers and owners.
It used to be di¢ cult for the owner of a truck to keep track of its progress. The owner
had no way to monitor continuously what happened en route, and a late arrival at the
destination could be blamed on mechanical problems, bad weather or heavy tra¢ c. The
information problem also meant that if the truck were to break down, it was di¢ cult for
the owner to tell whether the breakdown had been caused by driver negligence. With the
new technology, this has all changed.
Truck drivers are not unique. As another example, consider the case of retail clerks.
In a special report about new technology, Business Week described one of the uses of
information technology:
No part of a store churns up more data than cash registers. This is also where
employee theft is most likely to pop up. . . . With the press of a button,
managers can highlight irregular register transactions on their computers and
pull up corresponding video. This could enable them to catch cashiers who
cut deals for their friends or pocket cash refunds themselves. (Business Week,
11 September 2006, pp. 48-50).
The traditional cash register provided a way of ensuring that the money collected from
customers matched the money a clerk handed over to her or his employer. But it could not
prevent collusion between clerks and customers (i.e., deliberate undercharging), and it was
a crude instrument for measuring the work pace or productivity of the clerk. Cash registers
have proliferated and improved since their introduction in the 1870s but not until the late
1970s, with bar codes and networked computing, was there a fundamental change in what
the cash register did. With those changes, the cash register now creates a substantial
barrier to clerk-customer collusion and, as in the case of trucks, the new technology gives
managers the ability to monitor each individual clerks productivity, second by second.
Trucks and cash registers show how changes in technology can a¤ect the relative power
of workers and their employers, where power, as we use the term, means one partys
ability to a¤ect outcomes that matter for another. The power of a worker depends on
both the sensitivity of employer outcomes to the workers actions - is the worker able to
a¤ect a large operation or a costly piece of equipment, or is her work independent and
without much capital? - and on the employers ability to constrain the workers actions
through monitoring and intervention. High costs of monitoring individual workers, or the
employers ignorance of the state of nature in which they operate, leads, ceteris paribus,
to greater worker power and, as a result, to higher wages. Indeed, this is a standard
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result of e¢ ciency wage models. Poor information systems reduce the match between
contractible proxies for a workers e¤ort or output, and the e¤ort or output itself; the
power of workers is enhanced and the level of e¢ ciency wages tends to increase. This
holds whether the latter is understood as taking place in a gift exchange (Akerlof 1982) or
in an adversarial relationship in which performance is enforced through a combination of
employment rents, and a threat of dismissal following the principals subjective evaluation
of the agents performance (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984 and Bowles 1985).
There is substantial evidence of widening power di¤erences following the adoption of
ICTs, not least in growing industries such as retailing, banking and telecommunications
(e.g. Grimshaw et al. 2002; Miozzo and Ramirez 2003; Hunter and Lafkas 2003). Large
groups of low-paid workers face increased monitoring and more precise task specica-
tion, and these changes can be analyzed formally in an e¢ ciency-wage model: increased
monitoring implies that the workers risk of sanctions (ring) becomes more sensitive to
variations in the workers e¤ort.
Using this framework, Skott and Guy (2007) show that PBTC can account for a
simultaneous rise in the relative wage and the relative employment of high-skill workers.
In other words, PBTC can explain the particular employment-inequality pattern that has
been regarded as a key piece of evidence for the SBTC hypothesis. Unlike the SBTC
hypothesis, moreover, PBTC explains an increased intensity of work e¤ort, evidence for
which is reviewed by Green (2004).
PBTC sheds light on the great compression too. In the early twentieth century, eco-
nomies of scale, scope, and speed o¤ered substantial productivity benets to large mana-
gerial rms. These productivity gains were contingent on solving problems of coordination
and control, and the limitations of the information systems necessitated a relatively ri-
gid, single-path ow of materials and information. As result, in 1937 workers at General
Motors were able to bring a large part of the operations of the company and many of its
suppliers to a halt by sitting down in a few factories. The rigidity of the production sys-
tem gave small groups of workers the ability to disrupt production and strengthened their
bargaining power, and the ip side of organizational inexibility was a reduction in top
managersscope for action which limited their agency rents. These factors tend to reduce
inequality in a decentralized system of wage determination. Moreover, they provide a set-
ting for industrial conict which threaten the productivity gains of large-scale production
and, in some cases, the larger social order. Labor unions and government regulation can
be viewed as a way to alleviate these threats and promote orderly industrial relations.
Thus, the limitations of ICT facilitated the institutional changes that contributed to the
great compression.6
6Freeman and Medo¤ (1984) suggest another role for labor unions. If limited coordination technology
forces a rm to rely on relatively inexible rules, the rm can be brought to a standstill by its employees
working to rule. In this situation, doing a good job will sometimes require working beyond - and perhaps
even in violation of - the rules, and employees therefore expose themselves to arbitrary retaliation from
supervisors simply by doing a good job. In these cases unions may help ensure fair treatment, and as a
result, unionized companies may gain productivity benets.
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The explosive growth of new ICTs that started in the 1970s reversed these trends
by enhancing the exibility of rms and their ability to coordinate complex production
networks. This increased exibility reduced the ability of low-level employees to disrupt
production, and improvements in the monitoring technology led to further reductions in
the power of low-level workers. The new technology, however, can do little to monitor
the more complex actions and options of executives, and there has been a growth in
performance contingent pay - where performance is an outcome, not an action (Lemieux
et al. 2007). From this perspective, the very large changes in the top end of the earnings
distribution are not surprising.
To conclude, there is substantial direct evidence of power-biased technical changes, and
an e¢ ciency wage model shows that PBTC can potentially explain the observed patterns
of employment and inequality. Moreover, PBTC can contribute to an understanding of
the institutional changes that played a part in the great compression and its reversal.
4 Mismatch
High-skill workers are sometimes unable to nd jobs that matches their skills, and in many
cases they will then broaden their search, rather than go unemployed. A recent article by
Michael Luo in the New York Times described how the recession has produced
a new cadre of underemployed workers dotting American companies, occupying
slots several rungs below where they are accustomed to working. These are
not the more drastic examples of former professionals toiling away at survival
jobsat Home Depot or Starbucks. They are the former chief nancial o¢ cer
working as comptroller, the onetime marketing director who is back to being
an analyst, the former manager who is once again an individual contributor"
("Overqualied? Yes, but Happy to Have a Job", New York Times, 28 March
2010)
The measurement of mismatch is notoriously di¢ cult but studies suggest that overedu-
cationis widespread in all OECD countries. Estimates of the proportion of overeducated
workers range between 10 and 40% (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000), and the
results in Slonimczyk and Skott (2010) fall in this range too. Combining data from the Dic-
tionary of Occupational Titles and the Current Population Survey we found over-education
rates of about 15-25% in the US.7
7The DOT reports expert assessment of more than 12,000 job titles, and we take the General Education
Development (GED) index as our measure of skill requirements. The very detailed job classication of the
DOT is not available in any representative survey of earnings, but proxy measures forr 3-digit occupations
can be obtained by averaging the GED scores. The skill requirements data were merged with the Current
Population Survey earnings les. We use the education item to identify low- (high school or less) and
high-skill workers (at least some college).
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As shown in Figure 3, the share of employed workers with at least some college in-
creased from around 33% in 1973 to over 58% in 2002. This feature of the data will not
be surprising, but less well known is the substantial rise in the share of high skill workers
whose jobs have requirements below their skill level, at least according to the DOT experts.
At the beginning of the period only 14.7% of workers were in this category; toward the
end of the period the percentage of over-educated workers had increased by 10 percentage
points.
Figure 3 about here
The existence and persistence of signicant mismatch in the form of overeducation
may be surprising from a traditional Walrasian perspective but poses no problems in
an e¢ ciency wage setting.8 Drawing on Skott (2006), Slonimczyk and Skott set up a
formal model with two job categories and two types of workers. We assume that high-skill
workers can get two types of jobs (goodhigh-tech jobs and badlow-tech jobs), whereas
(for simplicity) low-skill workers have only one type of employment opportunity (low-tech).
Monitoring of workerse¤ort is imperfect, contracts are incomplete, and workers cannot
convincingly pre-commit to not shirking. One solution is for rms to use the threat of
dismissal as a way to elicit e¤ort, but for this threat to work, both good and bad jobs
must be rationed to ensure that employed workers receive a rent over and above their
best alternative. Good jobs pay more than bad jobs, which in turn must pay more than
unemployment. In equilibrium there will be both un- and under-employment (some high-
skill workers have bad jobs that do not utilize their skills), and inequality between groups
will depend not only on the wage gap between good and bad jobs, but also on the degree
of mismatch. The model, in other words, determines unemployment rates for both high-
and low-skill workers as well as a rate of underemployment (the proportion of workers
with jobs for which they are overeducated).
Now introduce a minimum wage and assume that it is binding in low-tech jobs but not
in high-tech jobs. When the minimum wage is binding then, by denition, it forces rms
to pay more than would be required to ll the low-tech jobs with non-shirking workers.
It follows that the no-shirking condition cannot be binding for both high- and low-skill
workers in low-tech jobs. There is now an extra degree of freedom in the determination
of who gets the low-tech jobs, but Bewley (1999) has provided empirical evidence on
how the model should be closed. In his study of wage setting behavior, Bewley found that
overqualied job applicants were common, but that many employers were reluctant to hire
them. Indeed, this shunning of overqualied job applicantsis highlighted as one of two
novel ndings of the study (p.18). Attitudes to overqualied applicants di¤ered somewhat
between primary and secondary sector jobs, where secondary sector jobs are dened as
short-term positions that are often part time. Both sectors received applications from
8Assignment or matching models can also explain mismatch (e.g. Sattinger 2006, Albrecht and Vroman
(2002).
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overqualied workers, but for primary sector jobs 70 percent of rms expressed a total
unwillingness to hire them, 10 percent were partially unwilling and only 19 percent
were ready to hire overqualied applicants (pp. 28283). Secondary sector employers
had fewer reservations, but only a minority (47 percent) were ready to hire themwith
30 percent being totally unwillingand 23 percent partially unwilling(p. 324).
Bewleys evidence suggests that rms prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs, as
long as the no-shirking condition is satised. This result can be included in the formal
model, thereby removing the extra degree of freedom, and the e¤ects of a change in the
level of the minimum wage can be derived. The results are striking: an increase in the
minimum wage unambiguously raises the employment of low-skill workers and reduces the
rate of underemployment of high-skill workers, and it may but need not generate a
reduction in average unemployment. What happens is that low-skill workers get pulled
into low-tech jobs when the minimum wage is increased and high-skill workers get thrown
out. The fallback position of high-skill workers in high-tech jobs now deteriorates, and
this relaxes the no-shirking condition in high-tech jobs and stimulates employment. The
monopsonistic e¤ects arise as a result of these spillover e¤ects from induced changes in
the degree of mismatch.9
We test the predictions of the model in time series regressions for the US as a whole
and panel regressions using state level data. This empirical approach is unlike most recent
work on the employment e¤ects of the minimum wage, which looks at specic groups
or industries that are likely to be strongly a¤ected, such as teenagers and restaurants
(see Card and Krueger 1995 and Dube et al. 2007). Our theoretical argument, however,
concerns macro e¤ects on the entire labor market that cannot be captured by a study of
a small subset of workers or industries.
The regression results are consistent with monopsonistic e¤ects of changes in the min-
imum wage. The coe¢ cient on minimum wages is negative in all time series and panel
regressions for low-skill unemployment, high-skill unemployment and the degree of over-
education. The regressions also give the expected negative e¤ect of the minimum wage on
the wage premium in high-skill jobs.
One should be cautious about causal attribution, of course. The minimum wage could
be endogenous and its decline could reect the decrease in the demand for low-skill work-
ers. This endogeneity argument would be particularly forceful if a decline were necessary
to prevent rising low-skill unemployment. Our model questions this premise, however,
showing to the contrary that low-skill employment may su¤er as a result of a falling min-
imum wage. It is probably true that the regression results for the minimum wage may
capture other inuences. Changes in the minimum wage are related to political pressures
and general ideological trends, and these trends have generated a range of non-market
changes, from labor market legislation and declining unionization to the deregulation of
9The monopsony model, literally interpreted to apply to single buyer markets, may have little relevance
but as argued by Manning (2003), labor markets can be monopsonistic, even if there is a multiplicity of
buyers of labor.
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the nancial industry. The estimated e¤ect of the minimum wage may capture some of
these other non-market factors. This potential problem of interpretation, however, does
not imply that non-market changes merely reect market fundamentals.
5 Conclusion
One-sector macro models with capitaland laboras inputs to production have come in
for heavy criticism. In my view, models of this kind can be very useful, but clearly they
have limitations. Sra¢ an critiques have focused on aggregate capital, but the neglect of
labor heterogeneity (and its interaction with non-Walrasian features of the labor market)
may be the more important shortcoming if one wants to understand the trends in US
income inequality.
The mainstream position on increasing earnings inequality emphasizes SBTC. This
leaves education as the main solution if one wants to reduce inequality and avoid un-
employment. This long-term remedy can be supplemented with employment subsidies or
changes in tax structures (earned income credits, for instance), but any attempt to improve
wages at the lower end of the distribution by raising the minimum wage or strengthening
labor unions will have signicant adverse e¤ects for employment, according to the SBTC
hypothesis.
This paper has examined two alternative explanations of increasing inequality, both
of which can be formalized using e¢ ciency wage theory.10 The distributional e¤ects of
technological change, rst, may derive primarily from a power bias, rather than a skill bias.
An explanation of rising inequality based on power bias implies that institutional changes
may be hard to implement. The changes associated with the great compression in the
1940s were at least partly consonant with the needs of business, and this facilitated
the changes. The improvements in ICT since the 1970s have given rms much greater
exibility as well as an ability to monitor and control low-level employees. As a result,
policies and institutional changes that strengthen workers and reduce economic inequality
are likely to be meet with much ercer opposition from business than during the great
compression.
Unlike the PBTC explanation, the other (non-exclusive) perspective gives grounds for
optimism. Business opposition may be erce but the crisis does o¤er opportunities for
social mobilization and policy initiatives that would have seemed unthinkable just a few
years ago, and induced mismatch implies that the observed patterns of inequality and
employment cannot be taken as evidence of a trade-o¤ between equality and employment.
In other words, it may be di¢ cult to implement changes, but reforms that reduce inequality
need not founder on inevitable employment losses.
The movements in inequality are of great importance in their own right. Most eco-
nomists in particular macroeconomists with their representative-agent models of inter-
10The basic argument behind e¢ ciency wage theory was recognized by the classical economists, see Kurz
and Salvadori (1995, pp. 332).
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temporal optimization may have a blind spot when it comes to income distribution, but
the welfare implications of the observed shifts are clearly momentous, and they also have
macroeconomic e¤ects. An increase in inequality whether caused by SBTC, PBTC or
changes in policies and institutions will tend to reduce aggregate demand, and in the
absence of other compensating e¤ects, rising inequality would have led to severe recessions
in the US a long time ago. The compensating e¤ects are not hard to nd, however. Public
sector decits have been expansionary although this has been partly o¤set by a drain
from the trade balance. More importantly, the stock market bubble in the 1990s provided
a stimulus to both consumption and investment, and when that bubble collapsed, the
housing boom and creative mortgages allowed saving rates out of distributed incomes to
fall even further. A need for bubbles to maintain aggregate demand does not, of course,
explain how the bubbles were created. But it does suggest that absent the adverse trends
in distribution, bubbles would have led to overheating and therefore would have been
quenched much earlier by an aggressive monetary policy. In this sense, it is not unreason-
able to view the long-term changes in the distribution of income as a central part of any
story about the nancial crisis.
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